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Phillip DeFedele 
DATA PROTECTION IN CLINICAL TRIALS: ADAPTING EU SOLUTIONS TO US RESEARCH 
I. Introduction 
 Clinical trials are the primary basis upon which the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) determines whether there is substantial evidence to support efficacy claims of new drugs 
as well as whether such drugs are safe.1 Clinical trials are studies in which human subjects are 
administered a new drug and they constitute a substantial part of the entire research and 
development process and are essential in order to obtain FDA approval of a new drug.2 Clinical 
trials take, on average, six to seven years to complete out of a total of ten to fifteen years for 
research and development.3 Thousands of patients may be enrolled in clinical trials through all 
three phases and, consequently, there are many actors involved in the conduct of such studies.4 
Due to the increasing presence of these many different actors involved in such trials, data 
obtained from those enrolled in the study must be transferred to and from these various actors.5 
These particular transfers of data in the course of a single clinical trial are the subject of this 
paper. 
 Data collected from clinical trials are entitled to special legal protections in order to 
safeguard the confidentiality and privacy of the human subjects involved in such research. In the 
United States, such protections are set forth in the Common Rule as well as FDA regulations, 
both of which contain additional safeguards for human subjects involved in research.6 In the 
European Union (EU), the colloquially known Data Privacy Directive, which broadly applies to 
                                                 
1 21 C.F.R. § 314.126. 
2 Id. 
3 PHRMA, 2013 PROFILE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY 32, 34 (2013). 
4 Id.  
5 See infra Part II.C.  
6 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 et seq.; see, e.g., 21 C.F.R. pt. 50 & 56.  
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all forms of personal data, provides for the protection of data that result from clinical trials.7 As 
the times and technology change so must regulations and, consequently, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) has decided to amend the Common Rule to strengthen, 
among other things, the protection of data obtained from human subject research.8  
 The HHS is seeking to apply requirements from another piece of U.S. legislation, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), to the Common Rule in order to 
provide the standards under which the privacy of research data will be protected.9 Instead of 
looking domestically, however, it may benefit the HHS, and ultimately the human subjects 
protected by the Common Rule, to examine non-U.S. methods of data protection, namely the 
Data Protection Directive, in crafting its own new protections. Ultimately, when it comes to the 
protection of research data from human subject research, there must be a balance between the 
interests of providing notice to and protecting the data of human subjects and ensuring that 
research may occur unhindered in order to encourage innovation and allow new therapies to 
reach the market as soon as possible. This policy of balancing such interests underlies this paper 
and ultimately guides the arguments made herein. Part II of this paper shall provide a brief 
history of human subject research protections, a brief overview of emerging technologies that 
may be the impetus for revising data protection policies, and an overview of the ANPRM as well 
as its relevance to FDA regulations and the actors involved in clinical research. Part III will 
provide an overview of the HIPAA standards that may be incorporated into the Common Rule 
and how they will apply to clinical trial research. Part IV will explain the applicable legal 
                                                 
7 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 
287/31) [hereinafter “Data Protection Directive”]. 
8 Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, 
and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 143, 44515 (proposed July 26 2011) [hereinafter “ANPRM”]. 
9 Id. at 44526. 
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framework under the Data Protection Directive as it would apply to clinical trials in the EU. Part 
V shall compare and contrast HIPAA and the Data Protection Directive with regards to research 
and advocate that the Data Protection Directive provides the best balance of the aforementioned 
policy interests. Lastly, Part VI concludes the paper. 
II. Evolution of Human Subject Research Protections, Data Protection Concerns in 
Emerging Technologies, and Regulatory Schemes 
 
A. Evolution of Human Subject Research Protections 
Prior to World War II, there was no international statement of ethical principles that 
should govern human experimentation.10 Protections for human subjects originated from the 
Nuremberg Code11 which resulted from the Doctors’ Trial in which Nazi doctors were put on 
trial for experiments carried out in concentration camps. The Nuremberg Code set forth ten 
principles pursuant to which research should be conducted.12 The most influential early 
document on human subject research protections, however, is the World Medical Association’s 
Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects13, more commonly referred 
to as the Declaration of Helsinki.14 The Declaration of Helsinki was developed by the World 
Medical Association (WMA) as “a statement of ethical principles for medical research involving 
human subjects, including research on identifiable human material and data.”15 The Declaration 
of Helsinki has been amended since its initial adoption in June of 1964 and contains general 
principles as well as special attention to, among other things, vulnerable populations, risks and 
                                                 
10 Delon Human & Sev Fluss, The World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives 4 (July 24, 2001), 
http://www.wma.net/en/20activities/10ethics/10helsinki/draft_historical_contemporary_perspectives.pdf. 
11 The Nuremberg Code, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (last visited Oct. 10 2014), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html.  
12 Id.  
13 Declaration of Helsinki, June 1964.  
14 Human, supra note 10, at 2.  
15 Declaration of Helsinki.  
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benefits, protocols, ethics committees, and informed consent.16 The Declaration of Helsinki also 
contains a principle concerning privacy and confidentiality which declares that “[e]very 
precaution must be taken to protect the privacy of research subjects and the confidentiality of 
their personal information.”17 Thus, even before the advent of modern technological advances, 
the privacy of individuals was already a concern on an international level.  
 In the United States, the National Research Act of 1974 established the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
(“National Commission”), which was tasked with identifying the basic ethical principles that 
should guide the conduct of research involving human subjects.18 In doing so, the National 
Commission produced the Belmont Report which summarizes the basic ethical principles for 
conducting human subject research.19 The National Commission set forth three principles in the 
Belmont Report: (1) respect for persons; (2) beneficence; and (3) justice.20 The principle of 
respect for persons encompasses the requirement to acknowledge autonomy and the requirement 
to protect those with diminished authority.21 The principle of beneficence is an obligation to do 
no harm and maximize possible benefits while minimizing possible harms.22 The final principle 
of justice is a sense of fairness in distribution and that equals should be treated equally.23 Most 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The 
Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research , Apr. 18, 1979 
[hereinafter “The Belmont Report”]. 
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
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significantly, the Belmont Report influenced the United States’ human subject regulations 
resulting in both the HHS and the FDA revising their respective human subject regulations.24 
 The preeminent federal regulations regarding human subject research are embodied in the 
Common Rule which was first published in 1991 by the HHS.25 The Common Rule applies to all 
research involving human subjects that is conducted or supported, meaning funded in whole or in 
part, by a federal department or agency.26 A human subject is defined as a “living individual 
about whom an investigator . . . conducting research obtains . . . [d]ata through intervention or 
interaction with the individual, or . . . [i]dentifiable private information.”27 Under the Common 
Rule, research is defined broadly as “a systematic investigation, including research development, 
testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”28 The 
Common Rule goes on to explain that an intervention may be a physical procedure by which data 
are gathered or manipulations of the subject, or his or her environment, performed for research 
purposes.29 Moreover, an interaction may be a communication or interpersonal contact between 
the investigator and subject.30 Given the collection of data involved in research, the Common 
Rule also addresses the concept of private information.31 
Private information under the Common Rule includes information about “behavior that 
occurs in a context in which an individual can reasonably expect that no observation or recording 
is taking place, and information which has been provided for specific purpose by an individual 
                                                 
24 Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’) , U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES (last visited Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/ .  
25 Id.  
26 45 C.F.R. § 46.101.  
27 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f). 
28 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d). 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
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and which the individual can reasonably expect will not be made public.”32 Moreover, private 
information must be individually identifiable, meaning that “the identity of the subject is or may 
readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the information”, in order for the 
ascertainment of such information to be considered research involving human subjects.33 Despite 
the attention given to defining private information, the Common Rule simply places the burden 
on institutional review boards (“IRBs”) to be responsible for protecting the privacy of subjects 
and data.34 Specifically, an IRB must determine that, among other things, there are “adequate 
provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data” prior to 
approving research.35 Although this provision may have been appropriate when the Common 
Rule was originally promulgated in 1991, the advent of new technologies resulting in increased 
informational risks requires more robust protections.36  
B. Data Protection Concerns in Emerging Technologies 
There are increasing uses of genetic information, biospecimens, and databases in research 
that result in informational risks, meaning risks of inappropriate uses or disclosures of human 
subjects’ information.37 Wrongful disclosures, such as those relating to substance abuse or 
chronic illness, may have practical adverse effects on a particular research subject, including 
jeopardizing employment and causing emotional and social harms.38 Two types of research 
techniques that incite such risks are bioinformatics and functional genomics.39 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7). 
35 Id. 
36 ANPRM, supra note 8, at 44513–44514. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 44516. 
39 YALI FRIEDMAN, BUILDING BIOTECHNOLOGY: BIOTECHNOLOGY BUSINESS, REGULATIONS, PATENTS, LAW, POLICY 
AND SCIENCE 41, 46 (2014). 
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Bioinformatics applies information technology to manage and analyze research data, 
which assists scientists in managing and interpreting such data.40 Bioinformatics utilizes 
computers to assist in data management which permits the collection and analysis of biological 
information, including deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequencing.41 The advantage of 
bioinformatics is the ability to extract information and detect certain patterns from large 
databases.42 Bioinformatics is also able to analyze masses of information and allow comparative 
analyses.43 Clearly, the ability to access and analyze large databases is susceptible to 
informational risks of improper disclosure or uses. 
Functional genomics focuses on gene activity in both healthy and diseased states, which 
allows analyses of how genetic variations may account for different levels of efficacy of a drug 
in certain populations.44 Specifically, pharmacogenetics studies how genetic differences affect 
how people respond to drugs in order to understand variations between drug targets and enzymes 
that affect efficacy and toxicity.45 This technique allows researchers to develop drugs that are 
capable of addressing the effects genetic variations may have on safety and efficacy.46 
Pharmacogenetics rely upon analyses of individuals’ genetic information, which is certainly the 
most unique and personal information about an individual, and, therefore, must have adequate 
privacy protections in place.  
All in all, these emerging research technologies must be subject to adequate data 
protections in order to not only ensure that such data is protected, but also to make sure that such 
                                                 
40 Id. at 41–42. 
41 Id. at 42.  
42 Id. at 43. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 46. 
45 Id. at 47.  
46 Id. at 48. 
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data is seen to be protected by regulators and subjects.47 Although one can argue that stringent 
protections may hinder research, the fact remains that research depends upon voluntary 
contribution and, therefore, if subjects were to lose faith in the safeguards in place to protect their 
data, it would have an adverse effect on their willingness to participate, which would impede 
new research.48 Therefore, adequate privacy protections are not only necessary for the protection 
of human subjects but are also necessary to ensure the continued success of research and the 
utilization of new research techniques. 
C. From the Common Rule to FDA Regulations 
 As further discussed below, the HHS in its ANPRM seeks to modify, among other things, 
the protection of data obtained from human subjects in the Common Rule.49 The Common Rule, 
however, only applies to research that is either conducted or financially supported by a federal 
agency.50 Therefore, absent such agency involvement, the Common Rule does not apply to a vast 
amount of research undertaken to achieve FDA approval of a new pharmaceutical product since 
they are typically privately funded by the sponsor.51 Such studies, however, are governed by 
FDA regulations codified in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations.52 Although research 
using federal funding and those for FDA approval are governed by different regulatory regimes, 
both sets of regulations stem from the same ethical foundation, specifically the Belmont 
                                                 
47 MARK TAYLOR, GENETIC DATA AND THE LAW: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRIVACY PROTECTION 5 (Margaret 
Brazier et al. eds., 2012). 
48 Id.  
49 ANPRM, supra note 8, at 44513–44514. 
50 45 C.F.R. § 46.101. 
51 Although it is often the case that pharmaceutical companies entirely fund their own research, an example of an 
exception to this is when a pharmaceutical company receives funding from the Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority (BARDA). See, generally, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority – 
PHE, PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY (last visited Nov. 22, 2014), 
http://www.phe.gov/about/barda/Pages/default.aspx. 
52 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. 56.101 et seq. 
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Report.53 Thus, respect for persons, beneficence, and justice, the three ethical principles laid out 
in the Belmont Report, are equally applicable to both the Common Rule and FDA regulations 
governing human subject research. 
 A more concrete example of this connection is the nearly identical language contained in 
both the Common Rule and FDA regulations.54 Like under the Common Rule, an IRB 
overseeing research subject to FDA regulations must ensure, among other things, that there are 
“adequate provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of 
data” in order to approve the research study.55 This is the exact same language contained in the 
Common Rule’s section concerning IRB approval of research.56 Given these strong parallels in 
origins and language, the considerations involving the reformation of the Common Rule should 
also apply to FDA regulations. In fact, because the Common Rule is only limited to studies 
receiving federal funding, there is a more urgent need to amend the FDA regulations given the 
vast amount of subjects involved and studies.57 Therefore, the revisions to the Common Rule and 
recommendations contained herein should apply and encourage equivalent modifications to the 
FDA regulations.  
As discussed further below, these revisions to the Common Rule were partially motivated 
by the increase in the amount of actors involved in the conduct of clinical trials. For starters, 
there is the sponsor, which, in most instances, is the pharmaceutical company seeking approval 
for its new drug.58 The sponsor initiates and maintains ultimate responsibility for a clinical trial.59 
A sponsor’s obligations include, among other things, selecting investigators, monitoring the 
                                                 
53 See supra note 24. 
54 Compare 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) with 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(7).  
55 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(7).  
56 Compare 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) with 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(7). 
57 See supra Part I. 
58 21 C.F.R. § 312.3.  
59 Id.  
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investigations, and ensuring that the study is conducted in accordance with the protocol.60 The 
sponsor may, however, delegate its responsibilities regarding the conduct of a study to a contract 
research organization (CRO).61 In such an instance, the CRO would be the middle man between 
the sponsor and any clinical trial sites. Moreover, each site where the clinical trial is taking place 
has a principal investigator that leads the conduct of the study as well as a study team made up of 
various personnel.62 Additionally, depending upon the nature of the clinical trial, the sponsor 
may utilize a Data Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB) to review the un-blinded data from the 
clinical trial in order to evaluate the safety of trial subjects and the validity and scientific merit of 
the trial.63 Thus, these various actors that, in part, spurred the HHS to revise the Common Rule 
further demonstrate the vast amounts of data transfers that occur in conducting clinical trials 
which must be subject to heightened data protection standards.    
D. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
The HHS released the ANPRM in order to address the drastically changed landscape of 
research since the Common Rule’s enactment in 1991 and to comply with the President’s 
Executive Order requiring federal agencies to review their respective regulations in order to 
make such regulatory schemes more effective and less burdensome.64 The HHS explains that, not 
only have research techniques changed, but also that many actors, in addition to the sponsor and 
principal investigators, have joined the research enterprise.65 In the ANPRM, the HHS notes that 
there are doubts as to whether the current regulatory framework is sufficient for the protection of 
                                                 
60 21 C.F.R. § 312.50.  
61 21 C.F.R. § 312.23.  
62 BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLINICAL TRIALS A GLOBAL HANDBOOK 617 (2010). 
63 FDA, OMB CONTROL NO. 0910-0581, GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL TRIAL SPONSORS: ESTABLISHMENT AND 
OPERATION OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA MONITORING COMMITTEES (2006). 
64 Exec. Order No. 13,563 (2011); ANPRM, supra note 8, at 44513. 
65 ANPRM, supra note 8, at 44513.  
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human subjects.66 The ANPRM seeks to amend the Common Rule to alleviate concerns about its 
adequacy in protecting human subjects and to respond to criticisms of the Common Rule related, 
to among other things, IRB review of research, informed consent, and increasing informational 
risks.67 As part of this overhaul, the ANPRM seeks to impose HIPAA standards for the 
protection of data in order to remedy the increased informational risks that are present in human 
subject research.68 The ANPRM urges that the current Common Rule approach requiring IRBs to 
evaluate informational risks may not be the best methods of minimizing such risks due to a 
potential lack of expertise regarding data protection.69 The ANPRM proposes to apply 
mandatory data standards as set forth under HIPAA to apply to all data that are collected, 
generated, stored, or used in human subject research.70 Therefore, the ANPRM seeks to enforce 
standards for the protection of data based on those set forth in HIPAA in all research studies 
governed by the Common Rule.71 
III. HIPAA 
 Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996 in order to, among other things, improve the portability 
and continuity of health insurance coverage, and to combat waste, fraud and abuse in the health 
insurance and health care delivery systems.72 The HHS had the responsibility to promulgate 
regulations regarding the privacy of individuals’ health information.73 These regulations 
encompass the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which is meant to assure that individuals’ health 
information is protected while allowing such information to be transmitted in order to promote 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 44513–44514. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 44516. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 44526. 
72 Pub. L. 104-191.  
73 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (2003). 
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high quality healthcare.74 The HIPAA Privacy Rule only applies to “covered entities” which are 
defined as health plans, healthcare clearing houses, and healthcare providers.75 A healthcare 
provider may be a person or entity that provides, bills for, or is paid for healthcare in the normal 
course of business.76 Although HIPAA mainly protects medical records and other related data 
used in providing and reimbursing healthcare and a pharmaceutical manufacturer is not a 
covered entity, the Privacy Rule already applies to research in a limited manner.77 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers must utilize hospitals and physicians in order to conduct clinical 
trials.78 Hospitals and practicing physicians that are not solely involved in the conduct of 
research fit the statutory definition of a healthcare provider under HIPAA.79 Therefore, when 
interacting with patients on an individual site level, the principal investigator, institution, and 
members of the study team that constitute covered entities are already bound by the provisions of 
HIPAA. Under the ANPRM, however, the concept of a covered entity is essentially moot 
because HIPAA privacy standards would apply to all actors involved in the clinical trial that are 
handling protected health information.80 
Under HIPAA, covered entities are broadly prohibited from using or disclosing protected 
health information except when permitted to do so, such as pursuant to a valid authorization.81 
Protected health information (PHI) is defined as “individually identifiable health information” 
that is transmitted or maintained in any form or medium.82 Individually identifiable health 
information is a subset of health information that identifies the individual or with respect to 
                                                 
74 Id. 
75 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.  
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 See supra Part I. 
79 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
80 ANPRM, supra note 8, at 45516. 
81 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a). 
82 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.  
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which there is a reasonable basis to identify the individual from such information.83 Health 
information is defined as “any information . . . whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, 
that: “[among other things,] relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or 
condition of an individual.”84 The concept of PHI also applies to individuals that have been 
deceased for 50 years or less.85 Although such data is considered PHI, it may be disclosed and 
used under HIPAA provided such use or disclosure is solely for research, documentation of the 
death of the individual is provided, and such use or disclosure is necessary for the research.86 
In the context of clinical trials, any data obtained from the subjects would constitute 
“health information” under HIPAA as they would relate to the health or condition of an 
individual and the drug’s effect on his or her health or condition. HIPAA, however, only applies 
to individually identifiable health information and, therefore, if the information is properly de-
identified, it is not subject to HIPAA protections.87 Thus in the context of clinical research, if a 
principal investigator were to de-identify any data collected from a research subject, he or she 
may freely transmit it to any entity, such as the sponsor or CRO. 
It is no easy task to de-identify data, however. There are two methods by which data can 
be de-identified.88 First, an expert with expertise in statistical and scientific principles and 
methods for identification may de-identify the data by applying such principles and methods and 
subsequently determine that the risk for re-identification is very small.89 Second, specific 
identifiers must be removed from the data related to, not only the individual, but also any 
                                                 
83 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
84 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). 
85 Id. 
86 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(iii). 
87 45 C.F.R. § 164.502. 
88 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b).  
89 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1). 
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relatives, employers, or household members of the individual.90 The identifies are names, 
geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, all elements of dates except year (in most 
instances), telephone and fax numbers, e-mail addresses, social security numbers, medical record 
numbers, health plan beneficiary numbers, account numbers, certificate and license numbers, 
vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, device identifiers and serial numbers, URLs, IP addresses, 
biometric identifiers, full face images, and any other unique identifiers.91 In order to qualify as 
de-identified information under these two methods, the procedures set forth therein must be 
strictly followed. Even limited data sets, which are discussed below, that have almost all 
identifiers removed are still considered PHI and subject to the protections of HIPAA.92 
Given the complexities of de-identifying data, there are two main methods by which data 
could be transferred from one entity to another without having to be completely de-identified. 
The first is through an authorization from the human subject and the second is through the use of 
limited data sets.93 HIPAA clearly states that an entity may not use or disclose PHI without a 
valid authorization, except as otherwise provided.94 There are specific standards that an 
authorization must meet in order to be considered valid.95 First, there are certain core elements 
that an authorization must fulfil which are a description of the information to be used in a 
specific manner, the name of the person/entity authorized to make the disclosure, the name of the 
person/entity to whom such information will be disclosed, a description of the purpose of such 
disclosure, an expiration date or event upon which the authorization will expire, and the 
signature of the individual and date.96 It is permissible for an authorization to not have an 
                                                 
90 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2).  
91 Id. 
92 45 C.F.R. § 154.514(e)(2).  
93 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508(a) & 164.514(d)(5)(e)(1).  
94 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a).  
95 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c).  
96 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1). 
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expiration date when used for research purposes, including the establishment and maintenance of 
research databases.97 In addition to these core requirements, an authorization must also make 
certain statements that provide adequate notice to the individual of his or her right to revoke the 
authorization in writing and any limitations thereon and the ability or inability to condition, 
among other things, treatment on whether the individual signs the authorization.98 Regarding the 
revocation of an authorization, an individual is permitted by HIPAA to revoke a valid 
authorization at any time in writing unless the authorized entity has acted in reliance thereon.99 
Lastly, an authorization must be written in plain language understandable by the research 
subject.100 
In addition to the standard authorization provisions described above, authorizations for 
research purposes are able to be used for future research and combined with other forms, such as 
the informed consent form for the study. As expressed by the HHS in the publication of the final 
HIPAA Omnibus Rule, authorizations may be used for future research studies.101 An 
authorization for future research purposes is valid so long as such future purposes are adequately 
described so that “it would be reasonable for the individual to expect that his or her PHI could be 
used or disclosed for such future research.”102 Although the HHS acknowledges that such 
purposes could include specific statements, it does not require them.103 It is important to note that 
this does not require the subject to have actual knowledge of such other studies. In addition to 
authorizing future research, research authorizations may be compounded with other documents 
                                                 
97 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(v). 
98 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2)(i)–(ii).  
99 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(5)(i). 
100 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(3).  
101 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; 
Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules , 78 Fed. Reg. 17, 5612 (Jan. 25, 2013). 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
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in order to create a compound authorization.104 Specifically, an authorization for research may be 
combined with any other written permission regarding that particular study or another study.105 
This includes combining an authorization with an authorization for the creation and maintenance 
of research databases or with the informed consent form to participate in the research.106 
Although HIPAA authorizations are a straightforward and transparent means by which a human 
subject’s data may be transferred from one actor in the clinical trial to another, there is another 
means by which such data could be transferred without requiring the subject’s consent. 
An entity may also use what HIPAA calls “limited data sets” to disclose data to a third 
party without obtaining authorization from the data subject provided that the entity and the third 
party enter into a data use agreement.107 Limited data sets must be de-identified in a similar 
manner to completely de-identified information although with less requirements.108 Similar to 
complete de-identification, a limited data set must exclude certain direct identifiers of the 
individual or of any relatives, employers, or household members of such individual.109 The 
identifiers are names, postal/street addresses, telephone and fax numbers, e-mail addresses, 
social security numbers, medical record numbers, health plan beneficiary numbers, account 
numbers, certificate and license numbers, vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, device 
identifiers and serial numbers, URLs, IP addresses, biometric identifiers, and full face images.110 
As noted, this de-identification process differs from complete de-identification only in that 
limited data sets may contain dates, political subdivisions smaller than a state, and do not broadly 
                                                 
104 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3)(i).  
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
107 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d)(5)(e)(1). 
108 Compare 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d)(5)(e)(2) with 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2). 
109 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d)(5)(e)(2). 
110 Id. 
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prohibit other unique identifiers.111 Limited data sets are only permitted to be used in a limited 
number of circumstances, namely, for purposes of research, public health, or healthcare 
operations.112 
In order to disclose limited data sets without needing to obtain the individual’s 
authorization, the disclosing entity must enter into a data use agreement with the recipient of 
such information.113 The data use agreement is meant to obtain assurance that the recipient will 
only use or disclose the data set for limited purposes.114 As with authorizations, however, data 
use agreements must meet specific requirements.115 A data use agreement must establish the 
permitted uses and disclosures of the data set, set forth who is permitted to receive or use the 
data set, and provide that the recipient will use and disclose the data only in accordance with the 
agreement, use appropriate safeguards to prevent unauthorized uses or disclosures of the data set, 
report to the disclosing entity any inappropriate uses or disclosures, ensure that any agents to 
whom it provides such data agree to the same terms and conditions of the data use agreement, 
and not identify or contact the individual.116 
In terms of research, a HIPAA authorization allows data to be transferred to another 
entity without the need to significantly de-identify the information and enter into agreements 
with such entities. Moreover, an authorization has several benefits in the context of research, 
such as being able to be combined with the informed consent form and authorizing future 
research. An authorization also more adequately balances the interests of notice and protection of 
human subjects and uninhibited research, especially considering that limited data sets do not 
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require notice to the subject. Importantly, a subject also has the opportunity to revoke an 
authorization. Therefore, the HIPAA authorization will be the basis for comparison against the 
EU legal framework for transferring data from one actor to another.  
IV. EU Data Protection 
 The EU has taken a very different approach to data protection from the United States and, 
in fact, has explicitly established a right to data protection, which is considered a fundamental 
right.117 The EU adopted Directive 95/46/EC118 (the “Data Protection Directive” or the 
“Directive”), more commonly known as the Data Protection Directive, in order to ensure that 
“the level of protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data is equivalent in all Member States.”119 Unlike HIPAA, the Data Protection 
Directive applies to all forms of “personal data” as defined in the directive.120 The Data 
Protection Directive applies to all 28 EU Member States121 as well as non-EU Member States122 
that are part of the European Economic Area (EEA).123 It is important to note that the Data 
Protection Directive acts as a framework which each individual Member State’s national laws 
regarding data protection must follow.124 To parallel the U.S. regulatory scheme, the Directive 
could be seen as the enabling statute which dictates the mission of an agency and purpose for 
which it may promulgate regulations; whereas, the national laws would be the regulations 
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implementing the statute. This paper will focus on the basic mechanism under the Directive that 
permits the transfer of personal data from one actor in a clinical trial to another.125 
 The Data Protection Directive relies heavily on concepts of “personal data”, “processing 
of personal data”, and consent in order to function. The Data Protection Directive makes a 
blanket prohibition on the processing of personal data unless, among other legitimate legal bases, 
the data subject has unambiguously given his or her consent.126 Moreover, not all personal data is 
treated equally under the Data Protection Directive as there are additional protections for special 
categories of personal data.127 Even for these special categories, however, consent is a valid basis 
for processing such data provided it is made explicitly.128 
 “Personal data” is defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person.”129 Such identified or identifiable persons are referred to as “data subjects.”130 An 
identifiable person means that such person can be identified, directly or indirectly, which means, 
in practice, that additional information capable of identifying the person can be acquired without 
unreasonable effort.131 It is important to note that the Data Protection Directive only refers to 
natural persons and, therefore, only natural persons are covered by its protections.132 Moreover, 
its protections only apply to living persons.133 As previously mentioned, there are special 
categories of personal data, known as “sensitive data”, which are subject to heightened 
protections.134 Sensitive data include, among other things, data concerning health or racial or 
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ethnic origin.135 In the context of clinical trials, the data gathered from the subjects regarding 
their medical condition and the effects of the subject drug on such condition as well as any 
genetic data collected constitute sensitive data and are subject to the heightened legal regime for 
processing such data. 
 “Processing of personal data” means “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means.”136 Such means include, but 
are not limited to, collection, recording, storage, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination, 
erasure, and destruction.137 It is clear that the concept of data processing is incredibly broad and 
covers a wide variety of activities even those as simple as talking.138 The aspect of processing of 
personal data examined in the context of this paper is the transfer of personal data from one actor 
to another in the setting of clinical trials. As already discussed, personal data may not be 
processed absent a legitimate legal basis such as consent. The concept of consent; however, is 
more than simply signing off on a request to process data as seen with HIPAA authorizations. 
 The Directive defines consent as “any freely given specific and informed indication of his 
wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being 
processed.”139 In order to be valid, however, the consent must fulfill the following elements: (1) 
the data subject must have been under no pressure to consent; (2) the data subject must have 
been informed of the object and consequences of consenting; and (3) the scope of consent must 
be reasonably concrete.140 Regarding the second element, the data subject must have sufficient 
information to make his or her decision, as determined on a case-by-case basis, in the form of a 
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precise and easily understandable description of the subject matter, including the consequences 
of consenting or the refusal to do so.141 The third element requires that the consent be specific as 
determined by the “reasonable expectations of an average data subject.”142 If the processing 
operations are to be changed or additional operations added in a way that could not reasonably 
have been seen at the time of initial consent, the data subject’s consent must be obtained again.143 
Provided the consent process fulfills these three elements and is made explicitly, a data subject, 
such as a human research subject, may have his or her sensitive data processed lawfully.144 There 
is a general recognition of a data subject’s right to withdraw consent that he or she can exercise 
at any time and at his or her discretion.145 Moreover, a data subject is not required to give any 
reason for the withdrawal and cannot be subject to adverse consequences as a result of such 
withdrawal.146 There is a unique nuance to the withdrawal of consent, however. The withdrawal 
of consent only applies to data processing to occur in the future, not that which has already 
occurred.147 If there is no legal basis to justify the further storage of such data after the 
withdrawal of consent, however, the data should then be deleted wherever such data is stored.148 
Therefore, although the data subject consented to the initial collection of data, the storage of such 
data is no longer permissible once consent is withdrawn and there is no additional legal basis for 
further processing.  
 As a corollary to the consent process, personal data must be “collected for specified, 
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those 
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purposes.”149 The entity that is processing the data must specify the purpose of the processing 
and notify the data subject of such purpose prior to the processing of his or her data.150 Echoing 
the requirement that consent be specific, it is unlawful to process data for undefined or unlimited 
purposes.151 For every new purpose, there must be a particular legal basis in order to process the 
data for such purpose.152 Yet, if a new purpose is not incompatible with the initial purpose, the 
data subject’s original consent may be a sufficient basis for the new purpose.153 In assessing 
compatibility there are four key factors that must be considered: (1) “the relationship between the 
purposes for which the data have been collected and the purposes of further processing”; (2) “the 
context in which the data have been collected and the reasonable expectations of the data 
subjects as to their further use”; (3) “the nature of the data and the impact of further processing 
on the data subjects”; and (4) “the safeguards applied . . . to ensure fair processing and to prevent 
any undue impact on the data subjects.”154 As an initial matter, this assessment should be carried 
out by the entity processing data; however, in the event of litigation, the court would then 
undertake this analysis.155 
The first factor focuses on the substance of the relationship between the original purpose 
and the purpose of further processing.156 The relationship may cover situations where the further 
processing was implied in the original purpose or situations where there is a partial or non-
existent link with the original purpose.157 The greater the differences between the purposes, the 
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more problematic it is for establishing compatibility.158 The second factor involves the issue of 
“what a reasonable person in the data subject’s situation would expect his or her data to be used 
for based on the context of the collection.”159 Generally, the more unexpected or surprising the 
further use is, the more it will be considered to be incompatible.160 If the original collection of 
the information was restrictive and specific, it is likely that there will be more limitations on 
further use.161 Importantly, the relationship between the data subject and individual or entity 
processing the data must be taken into account to determine whether there were inequalities in 
bargaining power or coerciveness during the informed consent process.162 If so, this factor will 
weight against finding that the additional purpose is compatible with the original one.163 
The third factor requires analysis of whether the further processing involves sensitive 
data which require special protections.164 If the information is sensitive, including medical and 
genetic data, the scope for compatible uses is narrow.165 Additionally, both positive and negative 
consequences must be considered in determining the impact of further processing.166 This 
inquiry also includes an analysis of the way in which the data are further processed such as 
processing by a third party and public disclosure or disclosure to a wide range of persons, 
especially if unforeseeable at the time of data collection.167  
The final factor looks at the safeguards which are in place and may serve as a 
counterbalance to any factors that weigh in favor of a finding of incompatibility.168 The Working 
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Party has suggested, however, that the first necessary step in ensuring compatibility is to re-
specify the purposes by providing additional notice to the data subjects and possibly allowing for 
them to opt in or out.169 In some instances obtaining additional consent may be required.170 All in 
all, these factors are to be applied on a case-by-case basis and, therefore, there are no bright light 
rules when it comes to determining compatibility.171 Because of this fact-sensitive inquiry, it 
may always be beneficial for one who is processing the data to keep the data subject informed in 
order to ensure that they are on notice and have the ability to consent to any further processing. 
This can easily be accomplished in clinical trials where researchers often follow up with subjects 
after the administration of a new drug. Therefore, if the subject’s data needs to be transferred for 
another purpose not contemplated in his or her original consent, it is possible to notify the 
subject of such purpose and obtain consent.  
As discussed, the Data Protection Directive allows personal data to be transferred from 
one actor in a clinical trial to another by obtaining the subject’s informed consent which elevates 
function over form and is an organic process encouraging constant communication between the 
researcher and subject. Additionally, the purpose of the transfer must be concrete and cannot be 
unlimited or undefined. Most significantly, a subject has the absolute right to revoke his or her 
consent which requires the deletion of his or her personal data absent an additional legal basis for 
the continued use or storage thereof. These key aspects of the Directive will be compared to 
HIPAA.  
V. Similar Processes with Significant Differences 
 As a practical matter, HIPAA and the Data Protection Directive are relatively similar 
regarding the ease of transferring data from one entity to another. Both regimes allow for the 
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collection of a research subject’s permission to use and transfer his or her data to another party at 
the initial time of contact, such as the informed consent process for participating in the trial. 
HIPAA does this through obtaining a written and signed authorization; whereas, the Directive 
achieves this through its own informed consent process.172 Additionally, regardless of the 
process, the research subject must be made aware of the purpose for which the data will be used 
and who will use such data.173 Moreover, there are instances in which the research subject’s 
consent may not be required in order to use the data, such as data sets and future research 
authorizations for HIPAA and compatible purposes and certain secondary uses for the 
Directive.174 There are, however, three significant differences between the regimes that, although 
subtle in some regards, demonstrate that the Directive provides the best balance of protecting the 
data of and notifying research subjects while unhampering research.  
 The first major difference is the informed consent process inherent in the Data Protective 
Directive that is lacking in HIPAA. The Directive requires informed consent in order for data to 
be collected, processed, and transferred between entities.175 The consent process, similar to 
informed consent for medical treatment, is reminiscent of an open dialogue between the data 
subject and entity or individual obtaining and using such data.176 The data subject must give the 
consent willingly and be made aware of the consequences of consenting and the concrete 
purpose therefor.177 This is in stark contrast to HIPAA’s requirement of an authorization. 
Although a HIPAA authorization must detail the purpose and who will use the data, HIPAA 
merely sets forth the requirements that must be contained in an authorization and not which 
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information should actually be communicated to the research subject.178 This is a significant 
distinction between the two legal regimes. Provided that an authorization form contains the 
necessary elements, the requirements in HIPAA are satisfied; whereas, in order for the 
requirements of the Directive to be fulfilled, mere documentation is not sufficient as there must 
be a kind of dialogue between the data subject and researcher.179 Given the increased 
informational risks today, ensuring that the research subject has a thorough understanding of the 
use of his or her data, especially genetic data, is important. Moreover, this requirement further 
ensures that researchers and those obtaining such data are adequately informing subjects.  
 Although this requirement may seem stringent and time-consuming, it best balances the 
interest of providing notice to the subject and allowing research to occur unhindered. For 
example, in the informed consent process, the data subject may be made aware of the purpose of 
the collection of his or her data and the processing thereof as well as which entities will be using 
the data.180 Therefore, where multiple actors are involved such as CROs, principal investigators, 
and the sponsor, the connections between them can be made clear and, therefore, the data subject 
may consent to the processing carried out by such entities.  
 The informed consent process’s advantages do not end there, however. Because the 
process can be viewed as an ongoing dialogue, it has the possibility to permit other purposes for 
processing data after initial consent has been obtained that would otherwise be incompatible and, 
thus, impermissible. As already discussed, a mitigating factor in determining whether an 
additional purpose is incompatible with the original purpose is notifying the data subject and, if 
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necessary, obtaining further consent.181 Provided the data subject is able to be contacted, this is 
only a slight inconvenience in comparison to the protections and notifications it provides.   
 The second major difference is the Directive’s limitations on the amount and types of 
purposes for processing permissible under a single legal basis while HIPAA has the ability to 
provide for future authorizations. Although it is a great step in the direction of streamlining and 
simplifying processes involved in conducting research, HIPAA’s allowance of such future 
authorizations does not truly provide research subjects with proper notice. Under HIPAA, the 
research subject must be provided adequate notice, which need not contain any specific details, 
so that the subject could reasonably foresee that his or her information could be used for further 
research purposes.182 This is a very low burden to meet. So long as it is reasonably foreseeable 
that a person’s data may be used for future research, which does not rely upon the subject’s 
actual knowledge thereof, the authorization is valid. In reality, this means that a research subject 
may have no idea in which studies their data are being used and would permit an unlimited 
amount of uses and studies for which their data are used. While this surely helps encourage 
research and simplifies the process for making research using such data possible, it completely 
ignores the principle of providing notice to the research subject. Additionally, because the 
research subject would not know the definite uses of his or her data, it would cause 
complications with his or her ability to revoke the authorization. This is so because a research 
subject may not have approved of a particular study or use of his or her data but, due to a lack of 
actual knowledge of such study or use, they cannot revoke the authorization for future research.  
 This is a drastic difference between HIPAA and the Directive. Although the third element 
of the informed consent process, which requires the scope of consent to be reasonably concrete, 
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is judged by a similar standard of what the reasonable expectations of the average data subject 
would be, it is compounded and strengthened by the requirement that purposes be specific and 
concrete.183 Additionally, under this requirement, there is a blanket prohibition of processing 
data for undefined or unlimited purposes.184 Under this blanket rule, it is likely that an 
authorization for future research under HIPAA would not survive such scrutiny. The true test, 
however, is whether or not the additional purpose is compatible with the initial purpose of data 
collection. 
 As already discussed, this is a fact-sensitive inquiry and there is no readily available 
answer as to which further research purposes would be permissible and those that would not.185 
In the context of this paper, however, the focus is on clinical trials for drug approval and, 
therefore, the purposes contained in the informed consent process would be tailored to the 
particular clinical trial. Therefore, it is unlikely that future studies that are separate and apart 
from the initial trial in which the subject participates would constitute compatible purposes, 
especially considering the sensitive nature of the information. Even, for argument’s sake, if a 
particular future purpose would be permissible under HIPAA and the Directive, the aspect of the 
Directive that sets it above HIPAA in regards to this issue is that, of the factors to be considered 
in evaluating compatible purposes, the fourth factor, which looks at safeguards in place, helps to 
mitigate any adverse consequences of the further processing by encouraging the provision of 
notice to the data subject and/or additional safeguards.186 Thus, under the Directive, even if 
consent is not required, there is a high likelihood that notice will be provided to the data subject, 
so he or she can revoke consent in the event he or she disagrees with such purpose. Moreover, in 
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the event the data subject cannot be reached due to death, the Directive no longer applies so 
research will not be inhibited as a result of an occurrence out of the researchers’ hands, which is 
similar to the exception provided in HIPAA.187 Therefore, once again, in regards to permitting 
future research/processing, the Directive provides the best balance of providing notice and 
protection to the data subject while allowing research to continue.  
 The third major difference is that the right to revoke is treated differently by the Directive 
and HIPAA. The right to revoke is incredibly important in regards to data protection because it 
allows the subject to ultimately have the final say in the use of his or her data. Thus, although 
revocation of consent/authorization makes up a small part of both pieces of legislation, its 
importance cannot be understated. As such, the distinctions between these legislative acts are 
incredibly significant in evaluating the superiority of one over the other. The Data Protection 
Directive, unlike HIPAA, provides an absolute right to revoke consent for data processing.188 
Although HIPAA does provide that a subject may revoke an authorization in writing, it permits 
limitations to be set thereon as well as restricts this right if such authorization has been relied 
upon.189 The Directive, on the other hand, contains an absolute right to revoke which is 
accompanied by an obligation upon the entity processing the data to delete any collected data.190 
Because the data must be deleted if there is no further legal basis to retain the data, the data 
subject is able to ensure that no further processing takes place by revoking his or her consent.  
 It is important to note that HIPAA protects against uses and disclosures of PHI and, 
therefore, if an authorization is revoked it does not necessarily obligate the formerly authorized 
entity to delete records of such data. Therefore, adequate protections must still be in place to 
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ensure that such data is protected, which have the possibility of failing. The Directive, through its 
implicit obligation on processors to delete data, however, provides the ultimate safeguard against 
unlawful processing or disclosure. Additionally, on a personal level, it may give a data subject a 
sense of relief knowing that his or her data is not just sitting stagnant in a database where there is 
a real possibility of a data breach. All in all, the right to revoke embedded in the Directive is a 
powerful tool to ensure that personal data is protected and processed for limited means. This 
right of revocation, on its own, is substantial evidence of the better suited nature of the Directive 
to handle sensitive information involved in clinical trials, especially genetic data.  
 The Directive through its informed consent process, limitations on purposes for which 
data may be processed under a single legal basis, and right to revoke helps ensure that the 
interests of notifying data subjects and protecting their data is equally balanced with the interest 
of carrying out research unhindered. It is this equilibrium that makes the Directive a preferential 
standard to HIPAA. Although HIPAA, in several respects, falls more on the side of encouraging 
research, it does not adequately balance this beneficial effect with notification to individuals. 
Additionally, the inherent limitations on the ability of an individual to revoke an authorization 
under HIPAA are substantial disadvantages to employing this legal framework. All in all, the 
Directive is the more appropriate approach to govern the protection of data in the context of 
clinical trials.   
VI. Conclusion 
 It is clear that the current landscape of clinical trials is complex, and regulators must 
account for both the safety and integrity of human subjects as well as encouraging innovation. 
While these interests may seem to conflict, ultimately, ensuring that research subjects are 
protected allows for their continued voluntary participation in research. Data protection is 
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increasingly important in this modern age given new research technologies and the types of 
personal information stored and used for research purposes. The HHS is correct in seeking to 
revise the Common Rule at this time, but, more importantly, the FDA must follow suit in order 
to ensure that the majority of research subjects involved in clinical trials for drug approvals can 
benefit from increased data protections. The HHS’s proposal to rely upon mandatory HIPAA 
privacy standards is admirable and a step in the right direction; however, as discussed, the EU 
Data Protection Directive more adequately balances the relevant policy interests while protecting 
human subjects’ data. Therefore, the HHS should look to this legal framework when it ultimately 
decides to enact its reforms in order to ensure that human subjects are adequately protected from 
information risks while allowing research to continue unhindered due to subjects’ willingness to 
participate in new clinical trials because of such protections.  
